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question of criminal jurisdiction is one of

growing importance from the fact that a citizen of our State
can be seriously affected in his property
his life

put in

jeopardy,

rights, or even have

by the act of another

living, a

thousand miles away, and in any one of fifty or mare sovereignties.

If a citizen of the United States is killed by an

explosive compound sent by a

citizen

of Russia with an intent

to work that result in this country, it is a question of importance in which country the guilty offender shall be punished.

If a citizen of New York goes over into Pennsylvania for

the purpose of evading the laws of this State and then returning, , it is a question of the utmost concern as to which
state shall have jurisdiction, or whether the guilty party
shall escape punishment

entirely.

I shall treat the subject,

first, briefly from an

international standpoint;

second, as to the jurisdiction of

the United States Courts;

and, lastly, as between the several

States of the Union.
It is a well established and fundamental principle
of criminal law in all civilized countries that crimes are
altogether local and cognizable and punishable only in the
place where they are committed.

Lord Longborough maintained

2
this view in

the case of Folliot v Ogden,

I H.

T.1.

135.

On

a writ of error in the same case, Mr. Justice Buller said:"It
is

a geneaal principle that the penal laws of one country can-

not be taken notice of in another."

Lord Ellenborough con-

firmed this view in Warrender v Warrender, 9 Biigh ll9.

The

same doctrine is firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of AmerChief Justice Marshall in the case of The Antelope, 10

ica.

Wheat. 66, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"The courts of no country execute the penal ladys of another."
And Chief Zustice Spencer in Scoville v Confield, 14 Johns.
338, concurred in this view when he said:

"The penal acts of

one state can have no operation in another state.

They are

strictly local, and affect nothing more tnan they can reach."
This doctrine seemed to have its origin in a rude personification of crime, and in the belief that it could only be avenged in

the place where the crime was committed..

can be traced in
United States,

Its force

that provision of the Constitution of the

Amendment VI,

which reads:

"In

all criminal

prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial

by an impartial

jury of the state and distwhich dist-

rict

wherein the crime shall have been committed,

rict

shall have been previously ascertained by law."

the fact that some places on the earth's

surface are

But from
not

J
of any

jurisdiction

within the territorial

coUntry,

and that

some nations have not reached that degree of civilization
that would entitle them to
family of natiorns,

and in

there are some apparent
tion which

be recognized
other cases

as belonging to the

from prudential

reasons,

exceptions to this general proposi-

ve will proceeA

to notice.

First, from an international standpoint.--

For a

long time offences comitted on the high seas and in barbarous lands went unpunished, as there were no courts at the
place of the crime to take cognizance of the offence.

It is

recorded that even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries buccaneers roamed the high seas, and brought unchallenged and unmolested into English ports

spoils which they had

of
taken from merchant vessels of other nations in times
peace.

But these unjust and piratical seizures were made the

subject of a statute under the reign of Henry VIII, whereby
offences committed on the high seas and in barbarous lands
were made punishable iy. England.

And it is noa well settled

that an act committed on a public vessel on t.,e high seas,
whatever the nationality, in punishable in the state to which
the ship belongs, and if a private vessel, then each state has
control of its citizens on board, and can punish them for tine
crime there committed, or can yield jurisdiction to the state
wherein the owners have citizenship.

4
These offences on the :iih
groupeJ into three classes:

seas

can be conveniently

First, those committed on ship-

board, and punishable in the country of the flag;

second, pi-

racies committed outside the territorial limits of any sove-reign are by the lay of nations punishable in

any civilized

country; third, those committed on the territorial waters of
a particular state while on board t~ie vessel of another state.
In regard to the third class, previous to 1676 both nations
gere assumed to have concurrent jurisdiction, but since then
the question has been much discussed, and is still in dispute.
The only rule in France is that they will not assert their
police power to punish crimes on foreign meochant vessels
wvithin their waters unless invoked by those on board, or unless liable to create some disturbance in their pirts.

So

far as the law is settled in this regard it seems to be that
every nation has the right to enact such lays Ls she sees fit
in regard to regulating those on board her vessels in foreign
pirts.

And at the same time they must respect the lays of

the country to which the port belongs and within whose jaris5iction they are.
As to offences committed in barbarous or semi-civilized lands against the citizen of a civilized state, they
are cognizable in

the courts of the offended state,

unless

by treaty stiPulations betwe.n them the consuls are given ju-

5
dicial power to punish citizens of the country from which the
consul is

sent for crimes committed in

By

the foreign land.

the 'Revised Statutes of the United States, #4084,

in pursuance

of treaties with China, Japan, Siam, Egypt, and Madagascar,
our consuls there are fully empowered to arrange in the manner
provided all

citizens of the United States charg-ed fith

ces against law committed in such countries.

offen-

And by #4088

this jurisdiction is claimed over islands or countries not
inhabited by any civilized country or recognized by any
treaty, and this extra-territorial jurisdiction over its citizens is assumed without treaty authorization.
We next come to te question of the jurisdiction of
one country over the citizens of another -ilthin the border of
the first named country.

It is a well settled rule of inter-

national law that offences against government,

or which in-

volve the security and safety of the state, such as treason,
perjury before consuls,
are justiciable in

and forgery of government

securities,

the country to which the offender owes cit-

izenship, no matter where the act is committed.

It is equally

well established that it cannot invade the territory of another state for the purpose of arresting the offender, but it
can demand extradition of him if

treaty stipulations provide

for the same, though the state in which he is at the time has
concurrent jurisdiction.

England goes ±rther than this and

6
claimd jurisdiction of
foreign countries.

its

citizens

for hlomicide

committed

But for political offences it is gener-

ally accepted that no country will punish except tni
fended,
a

an

citizen
ther,

t",or ord]inary
of one country

paper,

forgery of government

it

would

say that a citizen of the

and not be liable

would not only bring our government

would expose us to spoliation.
result

securities,

issue

forged

come safely back into the United States and

dispose of the same,
It

the

o.vn citizens.

could go over into Mexico and there

and then

by

of ano-

country have jurisIiction

a great failure of justice to

United States

of-

'9

committed

while witnin the territory

committed by one of their
As to

work

crimes and misdemeanors

the courts of the latter

same as if

in

to our government

to punishment here.
into

contempt,

A like injurious effect

but

it

would

and citizens were perjury before

con-

suls abroad to be left to the foreign jurisdiction for punishment.
As to offenses
through a domestic
ical agencies,
ferent

states

agent,

committed by a party acting abroa
or through infra-territorial mechan-

the same rules
of this

should apply

country,

and the

as between the dif-

question will be con-

sidered in that connection.
Next comes the jurisdiction of the United States
courts in criminal matters.

Early in the present century, it

7
was decided

that theru

United States.
Rollman,

parte

vere no

common law offeices

against

thii

Even in 1807 Chief Justice Marshall in Ex
4 Cranch 75,

said:

"This court disclaims

all

jurisdiction not given by t:e Constitution or the lays of the
United States. Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by t .e common law
until some statute

shall change their established principles;

but courts which are created

by written law,

and ahose juris-

diction is defined by -,ritten law, cannot transcend tuat jurisdiction."

This doctrine, that had long been settled in

the public mind, was definitely decided by the Unites States
Supreme Court

in United States v Hudson, 7 Cranch 32.

The

United States government has such powers and only such powers
as are

delegated to

it

by the Constitution.

By Article I,

Section 8, of that instrument congress shall have power to
fine
seas,

de-

and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
and offenses

against the law of nations.

In

accordance

with this Congress has declared that certain acts done on the
high seas or in any arm of the sea, or in any

river, haven,

creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States,
'Nany particular state,

and without

the jurisdcition

of

shall be crimes against the United States

and punishable in its courts.

Whether this grant of power to

the courts by Congress includes alcts committed on the Great

8
Lakes has never been satisfactorily

determined.

It

,vas thoAht

by Justice Brown in Ex parte Byers, 32 Fed. Rep. 404, 410,
that the State courts had exclusive jurisdiction of crimes
committed on the American side of the boundary line of the
Great Lakes and their connecting waters,

and that the Feder-

al courts had no jurisdiction of crimes committed on the American side of' the waters,

as they were clearly not

meaning of Congress when it
tine sea,

or in
It

Article IV,

is

any river,

,iithin the

said high seas or any other arm of

haven,

basin,

or creek.

also provided by the Constitution,

Section 3,

that Congress shall have power over all the ter-

ritory or property belonging to the United States, and over
all places purchased by consent of the legislatures of the
States in which the same shall be for tihe erection of forts,
arsenals,

dock-yards,

and other needful buildings.

This pro-

vision was the cause of much litigation until the matter was
finally decided in

Clay v State,

Godfrey,

225.

17 Johns.

4 Kan.

49,

and The People v

In the latter case a crime was com-

mitted within the boundary of Fort Niagara, and it was held
that the United States courts had no jurisdiction of the crime,
as no cession of such place had ever been made by the State
to the national government, though that government had had
control of the fort ever since the British had surre ndered
dominion of the same.
that where the place is

The controlling principle se,-ms to be
.itliin thre boundary of a State,

and

9
it

has not been expressly excepted in

the act admitting the

State into the Union, and where there has been no cession of
such place to the United States Government, then the State ana
not the Federal courts have jurisdiction.
We orill now consider how far the doctrine of extraterritoriality has been extended as between the different
States of the American Union.

It ,vould seem that here the

utmost liberality could be shown in this matter, from tre similarity

of conditions in

the different States,

and the gen-

erally prevailing public sentiment that no crime shall go unpunished wherever committed.

It is a universal doctrine thet

each State possesses power to provide for the punishment of
offences within its own limits, except such as the National
Constitution confers on the Federal Government.
same time it

But at the

cannot provide by legislation for the punishment

as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary,
cause

such acts if

offences at all are offences against the

sovereignty within whose limits they are committed.
it

is

be-

However

not necessary that the offender be corporally within

the State when the guilty act is done.
limits of the State,

if

he is

Even when without the

the agent or instrument through

whose unlawful acts consequences result that are injurious to
the State,

then it

seems that the offender can be punished as

effender against such State.

Barkhunsted v Parsons, 3 Conn.

10
People v Adams, 3

Denio 190, 210.

extent arxd

It is as to tie

limitations of this doctrine that disputes have arisen betveen
the different States.

In an early case in Massachusetts,

Commonwealth v Green, 17 Mass.

540,

ed whether a conviction for felony

the question was considerin one State would have

any effect in preventing the convicted person from testifying in another State.

It was

claimed by those endeavoring to

prevent this testimony from being given, that it came within
the provision of the United States Constitution that

"every

2tate shall give due force and credit to judgments obtained in
other States,"

and as the judgment of felony prevented the

testimony from being given in that State,

the Constitution

prevented its being given in any other State.

But the testi-

mony was admitted, the court holding that the clause in the
Constitution applied only in civil cases, and that

no State

could give effect to a criminal judgment in another State.
This question is no longer of importance, as the jury are now
allowed in most if not all of the States to weigh for what it
is worth the evidence of one who has been convicted of felony
even in that State.
As to larceny when the goods are stolen
ty

in one coun-

or State and carried by the thief into another county

or State, it is now universally admitted that the offense
can be punished in any

county where the stolen goods are found,

ii
not that the offence was
here

committed and completed

the goods were taken,

but that

continue and hang over tL~e offender
the stolen

Ioods are brought.

the offense
in

evury

another,

from a foreign

when brought from Scotland or Ireland,

de4

in

to
.Vhicii

common

England to

country,

the absence

Some early cases in this country holi

lish view, that the indictment

is

This was even true at
from one county in

statute.

t le place

county into

law when the goods wvre taken
but not when brought

in

or even
of

with the Eng-

could only be in the Statt

where tine :oods were stolen, that the States were foreign to
each other in

this

regard;

but the later

cases hold that

the

thief can be indicted in any State in .iiich he takes ti:e
oods.

Hamilton v State, 11 0. 435.

Iowa 482.
states,

Commonwealth vWhite,

as Massachusetts,

State v Burnett, 14

123 Mass.

Connecticut,

433.

A number of

North Carolina,

Mary-

land, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Iowa, Oregon, and Ohio,
have claimed this right of jurisdiction when stolen goods
were brought within those States, even in tie absence of statutory authority.
to

exist in

In other States the right has been held not

the absence of statutory provision when

are brought from some foreign country.
ard,

3 Gray 434.

But this

the doods

Comnonwealth v Uprich-

has been decided the other way in

the case of The State v Bartlett,

11 Vt. 65, where an indict-

ment was held to lie in Vermont for oxen stolen in Canada,

12
and brought

into that State, an-, this

State v Underwood, 49 Me.
been passed making

181.

case is upheld in The

In other States statutes have

the offence indictable here when goods are

brought from a foreign country, and such statutes have been
held constitutional.

People v Burke,

igan, t? e statute, which reads
country,"

11 Wend. 129.

In Mich-

"stolen in any other State or

was held constitutional in People v Williams, 24

Mich. 157, where the goods were stolen in Louisiana and brought
into Michigan.
said:

Judge Cooley, writing the opini(,n of tie court,

"Now it may be true that this would not have been an

offense at common law, but that does not prevent its being
made so by statute."

But in another Michigan case,--Morrisey

v People, 11 Mich. 327,--where the larceny was in Canada and
goods brought

into Michigan,

the same

court was equally di-

vided as to the constitutionality of the act.

This question

is well considered in a Massachusetts case,--Commonwealth v
Uprichard, supra,--decided in 1855, where a thief who had
stolen goods

in Nova Scotia and brought them into that State

was held not indictable there.

The judge tried to establish

a different

when the

from a sister

principle

from that

State of the Union.

are brought

The judge says:

proceeds on the ground that the -,oods
this State.

goods

"This case

were actually stolen in

It is only by assuming that bringing stolen goods

into t.is State from a foreign country makes the

act larceny

here, that their allegations
volves

the necessity

ascertain whether the

can be sustained, and this in-

of goin,
act

to the law of Nova Scotia to

done was

felonious, and consequent-

ly whether the goods were stolen.
operation
here.

of the

force of both la,,s that it

is

the combined
made felony

It is said they commit a new theft by the possession

of stolen goods
goods?

in our jurisdiction.

But what are stolen

Are we to look to our own law or to

Scotia to
ours,

So it is by

determine?

If

Nova Scotia law is

then we may be called

which is

innocent here.

If

txe law of iova
different

from

on to punish as a crime that
we look to our law,

then a

taking

and carrying of goods in Nova Scotia under circumstances which
would not be criminal there might be punishable here.
they can be

If

indicted and punished here on the ground that

such g(ods were

stolen where they were brought

in,

it

seems

difficult to distinguish this from judicially enforcing and
carrying into effect the penal laws of another government."
In State v Underwood, 49 Me. 181, the court arrived at an opposite conclusion from an exactly
three judges dissenting.

similar state

of facts,

The justice writing the opinion in

the case takes occasion to refer to the Massachusetts case
above

cited,

case not well

and considers

the reasoning of Judge Shaw in

founded when he draws

a distinction

that

between a

sister State of this Union and a foreign country, from the

14

pendent
in

in

their

relation

their

States are as

the different

fact that

administration

sovereign and as

inde-

of criminal law as they are
The laws of the

with foreign governments.

foreign

country are not included among the elements which con-

stitute

the

Whether

they were guilty of stealing

crime for which the

defandants were

indicted.

the goods must be first

determined according to our laws concerning larceny, and if
they were thus guilty, then thie guilty possession of the goods
here was larceny here.

As larceny

is

not

an extraditable

crime with England, if Massachusetts doctrine prevailed then
thieves might steal with impunity in Canada, anL the border
States of this Country would become a refuge for tnem.

In

neither Maine nor Massachusetts was there any statute on this
subject when these decisions were rendered.

From the tenden-

cy of the decisions, then, I think it can be safely coneluded that an indictment for larceny will lie in any county
from another coun-

or State where the stolen goods are brought
ty or State,
a statute.

and generally

so held even in

the

absence of

When brought from a foreign country a few States

hold that the crime is not indictable here, though there seems
to be no substantial

reason why this

distinction

should be

made.
The next class of cases is

that by which a resident

of one State by means of false pretences through an innocant
agent

in

another State,

or by means of forged checks or drafts
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sent into another State, succeeds in obtaining money in the
latter State.

In Adams v People, I N. Y. 173, a resident of

Ohio obtained money in New York through tie representation of
an innocent agent residing here.

The defendant

,vas heli lia-

ble and within the jurisdiction of New York, though never
within the State. The theory on which these cases are decided
is

ti1at the crime is

tained.

If the act had been complete when he procured tie

agent to act,
in

not consummated until the goods are ob-

thien Ohio law alone could punish.

Michigan draws a forged check on a bank in

sends it

here,

the crime

is

So if

New York,

and

not cc-nsufmated until the check

is received, and hence punishable in the latter place.
v Rathbun, 1 Wend. 50-.

a man

People

Lindsey v The State, 36 0. St. 509.

WAfhere an accessory before tie fact is
jurisdiction where the crims is committed, the

o~jtside the
,veight of au-

thority seems to be that the accessory can only be punished
where his guilty act took place.

State v Chapin, 7 Ark. 561.

State v 7!yckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65.

John v State, l

State v Moore,

26 N. H.

448.

These cases proceed

Ind. 421.
on the prin-

ciple that the guilty act is completed in the State where the
act of aiding or abetting is done, and hence punishable there,
while the guilty agent, who is the principal, is punishable in
the State where the act is

cwiitted.

The courts of Connec-

ticut take a decided stand the other way, as expressed in the

case of The State v Grady, 34 Conn. l7i.,

where Grady con-

spired with certain accomplices in t ,e City of New York to
commit the crime of larceny in Connecticut.
C-O)1T

The

defense was

tS

tiiat the Connecticut had no jurisdiction to try those who
participated in the plot in New York.

The court

says:

general proposition tviat no man is to suffer criminally

"The
for

that done outside the jurisdiction applies only ,ihen tn.e act
It is the highest injustice

is completed outside t -e country.
that a man should be protected

from doing a criminal act be-

cause he is personaliy out of the State.

The doctrine is

that as an accessory he must be pursued in the locality where
he committed the enticement, but this has never been recognized in this State;
inal law,

is inconsistent with our system of crim-

and does not

commend itself

the doctrine originated as
it

is

Bishop says

in t=ie blunder of some

vicious and inapplicable in

this

coun-

judge,

an.

try."

These cases are to be distinguished from those wherein

the agent

that

to our judgment; that

is an innocent party, and it is to be notea that

although an accessory before

tie

fact is now punishable as a

principal in most of the States, the same rales apply as when
the

technical

term was used.

There has been much difference of opinion in the
courts of this country as to which county or State has

juris-

diction when a mortal blow is struck in one county or State
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and death ensues in another.
weight of authority

that

It is now well settled by tie

Thi-re the blow is

and death results in another county
offense is

given in

in same State, that the

committed where the blow is given.

21 Minn. 369.

State

v Bowen,

9 Humph. 646.

U. S. v Guiteau, I

one county

State v Gassert,

16 Kansas 475.

Riley v State,

1!1ackey 49o.

Green v State,

66 Ala. 40.
However statutes have been upheld in some States
making the act punishable in either State, and some of tne
States have enacted treat where death occurs
from a mortal wound
flicted, without

,ithin

-,iven, cr ot,:.er violence

tie State

or injury in-

the State, that the offence is triable in

the State .There death occurs.
Comrnon vealtn v lacloon,

Tyler v People, 8 Micn. 320.

101 Mass.

1.

The last case gives an

exhaustive review of the authorities, English and American,
and arrives at the conclusion that the statutes giving jurisdiction where death occurs are constitutional,
intimates t>-at tie same
statute.

vould be true

even in

and strongly
the

absence of

But tne more logical view .hen no statute intervenes,

and the one better

sustained

by the authorities

to-day,

is

found in the opinion of thae judge in The State v Bowen, 6 Kan.
475.

lie says:

"It seems to us reasonable to hold tnat as tne

only act the defendant

does toward causing the death is

giving the fatal

the place

blow,

'where he does

it

is

tie

in

place where he commits
wanderings

of the

the crime,

and that

the

subsequent

injured party uninfluenced by the defendant

do not give an ambulatory

character to tne crime,

at least

that those movements do not, unless under express warrant of
statute,

change

the place of offence;

and while

it

may beftrue

that the crime is not completed until death, yet that death
simply determines
giving the blow,

the character
and refers

of the crime committed in

back and modifies

Where place of death has jurisdiction, it
regarded as having been committed there,

tilat act."

is not because it is
but because

some

rule of law, statutory or otherwise, confers jurisdiction.
The modern and more rational view is that the crime
ted where

the unlawful

act is

is commit-

ione.

Another class of cases somewhat similar to those
already noticed is where
take effect

one without the State does an act to

within the State,

as when one fires

a gun,

or

sends a poisonous compound, or an explosive package, or diverts or swells the course of a stream, or publishes a libellous letter, any one of which is to produce its ultimate and
injurious result, not where tue perpetrator was, but where the
act took effect.
punishnent

In all these cases the act was committed and

should be had where the

criminal act took effect.

It was not completed in any other jurisdiction, and the eviJence and effect

of the crime comm-itted

can both be

inquired

19
into wh r

the act was consummated.

point see Stillman v Vhite Rock Co.,

For authorities on this
3 Wood & M. 538;

Common-

wealth v Blanding, 3 Pick. 304; Connonwealth v Smith, 11 Ali-n
243;

Commonwealth v Macloon,

Denio 190; R.

v Garrett,

101 Mass.

1; People v Adams,

6 Cox 260; Robbin v State,

3

8 Ohio St.

131.
A concurrent jurisdiction is sometimes held to exist in the country where the act or conspiracy is planned.
Wharton's Criminal Law,
It

Vol.

I,

4279, 208.

would seem that when the act is

eign country and takes effect in
are applicable,

done in

a for-

this co-Lntry the same rules

though the offender is

not personally amenable

to our laws till he comes within their jurisdiction.

R. v

Marley, 1 Cox 104; R. v James, 4 Cox 198.
It

has come to be a question of considerable

impor-

tance whether a State can punish for the crime of bigamy
where the second marriage took place in

another jurisdiction.

In the absence of a statute giving a State jurisdiction for
an extra-territorial crime we know of no decision holding that
the State has power to punish for the bigamy committed in
another State.

This question is carefully considered in the

case of Dickson v Dickson, 24 Am. Dec. 444, where a woman
married in Kentucky, and afterwards abandoned her husband,
and he obtained a divorce,

and she was forbid:ien to marry

_0
She soon afterwards went ovur into

again.

ried Dickson who

soon died,

resisted by the heirs.
the judge

ZfnlJ

Tennessee and mar-

she claimed

dower which was

The case came up in Tennessee,

in his (,pinion said:

"Had she come

and

into tftis State

ani married Dickson before divorce, she would have been guilty
of bigamy,

for it

mattered not where

place, if

legal

riage in

Tennessee

fina

the first

marria,)e took

in the country where solemnized, second marsould be bigamous.

I have endeavored

to

some legal principle that would avoid the second mar-

riage, but I am unable to do so.

She was freed from all

mar-

ried relations in Kentucky, but subject to all the pains and
penalties as to bigamy as if former marriage was still good;
but the State of Kentucky cannot complain because her penal~y
laws cannot extend beyond her own territorial jurisdiction.
Not punishable in Tennessee, because no Tennessee lall has been
violated.

Not

husband living.
States

can be

for bigamy in

Tennessee,

No principle of comity

extended to give

force

because no former
among neighboring

and effect

to tne penal

la':is of one society extra-territorial to the other, and for
many reasons it would be equally inconvenient, not to say impracticable, to adopt the principle among sister States of
the American Union, for which this bourt has the
authority of the United States
loore,

5 Wheat.

68; Earthmore

Supreme Court."
v Jones,

conclusive
HIouston v

2 Yerger 40

6

.
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in

Two cases

New York

In Van Voorhis v Brintnall,

illustrate

the same principle.

66 N. Y. 18, a marriage between

A and B had been dissolved on account of tne adultery of B,
Then B. and

the husband, and he was forbidden to marry again.
C, she also livin{
and were married,

in this State, went over into Connecticut
and returned at once

to this

State.

The

marsecond marriage -gas held valid, and the children of their
would share
The judge says:
in a devise.
riage~with those of the first
"Examples of legislation are not wanting making an act committed out

of the State punishable within the State by special

provision of law.
goods.

But

in

Such is our law against duelling and stolen

the very next

section on bigamy there is

such enlargement of the statute.
duelling laws, etc.,

no

Why expressly charged in

if it could be applied in other cases?"

The same principle is applied in Thorp v Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602.
The law seeming to be thus settled where no statute
we will next

controls,

consider the effect of statutes making bigamy

punishable whenever the

,-uilty one is apprehended in the State,

no matter where the bigamous act -,as committed.

This question

arose in Wells v The State, 32 Ark. 563, under a statute of
that State which reads:

"An indictment may be found against

a person for a second marriage in any county in wnich such
person may be apprehended, and like proceediings had as

if the

offense had been committed therein, the venue being immaterial.
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The court says:

"The legislature has no more power to pro-

vide that a man be indicted
he may be apprehended,

!or higamy in any count g in which

r,,qardless

offense may have been committed,
provision as
is

provision
"In
right

all

the p -ramoLuit

law

the county in

has to make a

of Parliament,

in

The constitutiona]l

by an impartial

jury of

shall have been committed."

England

would have been within the power

because Parliament

as legislatures

like

and cannot be disregarded.

trial

which the crime

A similar statute

z-hich the

the accused shall enjoy tile

speedy and public

constitution

than it

county in

to murder or any other crime.

criminal prosecutions
to a

of the

is

are in

not limited by
this

ritten

country."

A similar conclusion was reached in the

case of

The State v Cutshall, 15 S. E. 261, a N. C. case, wherein the
statute

reads

that

"if

any person being married shall

marry

any other person during the life time of the former husband
or

rife,

have taken place

whether the second marriage shall

in North Carolina or elsewhere, every such offender shall be
guilty of a felony,

and every such offense may be punished in

the county where the offender shall be apprehended
tually

committed there."

tutional by the h
right of trial
were

so triable

ighest

This statute

at common law,

and in

ac-

was declared unconsti-

court of that State,

by a jury of the mizag

as if

in

all

as

denying

a

cases which

violation of the provi-

''3
o-

imprisoned

shall be

sion that

no person

liberties

but by the law of the land.

disseized of his
as will be

The statute,

seen by its terms, applies as well to a citizen of another
State who in transit through t 'e State affords an opportunity
to the local authorities to apprehend him, as to those who become domiciled within its borders;

and this attempt to evade

the organic la-r of the land, which guaranties to citizens of
all the States the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the several States,

and which under the inter-state com-

merce clause gives them the right to pass through any State
without arrest and inquiry into their accountability for offences against

another sovereignty,

citizen went over into

intent to

too palpable a violation
Even if

sanctioned by any court.

of fundamental rights to be
the

is

South Carolina,

and married with

evade the laws of North Carolina, and immediately

returned to that State, the lay of the latter State cannot
punish for the bigamous act was
in

another State,

and could by tne organic law of the State

and nation only be tried
Had the statute

tkully and completely committed

t2.ere by a jury of the vicinage.

been limited to. persons

have a husband or

.ithin

tu-e State who

vife living, and who shall marry another

person without the State, and shall afterwards cohabit with
such person within the State,
not in

the bigamous marriage

and making
in

the felony

anothier State,

consist

but in

the

con-
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tinuous

cohabiting

,vithin the State, then it

would have been

Clearly constitutional as providing for a crime committed
within the State.

This latter view has been maintained in

Commonwealth v Bradley, 2 Cush. 553; Bremer v State,
102;

State v Palmer, 18 Vt.

571.

570;

59 Ala.

State v Fitzgerald, 75 Mo.

As expressed in Brcmer v State, supra, "Our statute on

this subject

covers two crimes; one of them, the offense of

bigamy, can be punished only where the unlawful marriage is
solemnized;

the other is complete and punishable

in any coun-

ty in which the parties continue to cohabit afterwards."
The statute

in

New York is

broad and general

in

its

terms, and it has not yet been decided whether it includes the
act of continuous cohabitation in this State after a second
marriage in another State, the first husband or wife being
still living, and no divorce having been obtained by either
party.

Where a divorce has been granted and one party has

been forbidden to marry again, it has been -Aecided in t.io comparatively recent cases that the party so

forbidden can go

over into another State and re-marry, and return at once to
Van Voorhis v Brint-

this State without

fear of conviction.

nall, 86 N. Y. 18;

Thorp v Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602.

The statute in New York,--Section 676 of Penal Code
is as follows:

"A person alho comnits an act without this

State which affects persons or property within this State, or
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if' committed within this State would be a crime,
as if

is

the act were comitted within this State."

In

punisiable
vie ,v of

The decisions in the two cases above mentioned, it is extremely doubtful whether it

was within the intention of the legis-

lature to make punishable by this Statute acts of continuous
habitation here,

when the second marriage was

in

another State

even though there had been no divorce from the first marriage.
Statutes extending the penal jurisdiction of a State are to
be strictly construed, and are to cover nothing more than
their terms clearly import.

As Chief Justice Marshall says

in United States v Fisher, 2 Cranch 369:
infringed,

"Where rights are

where the general systems of the laws is

departed

from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to support a
aesign to effect

such object."

In all these cases of conflicting jurisdiction,
State, national, or international, the question of extratition is closely connected with that of extra-territoriality.
Whether a State should extradite an accused person, or retain
and punish him for a crime committed outside its jurisdiction,
or allow him to remain in the State unpunished, ,iill depend
on the nature of the crime, the proximity of the one State to
the other, and thie jegree of civilization in each as evidenced
by the prevailing sentiment regarding the punisrnent of criae.

It would seem as

a matter of justice and humanity

that a State should either surrender a fugitive from justice,
or else retain
if

and punish lim for a crime

cognizable by t

eir

law,

free thou h gIuilty man,
State,

committed

elsewthere

and not allow him to remain a

thus menacing

the security of the

inviting crime by the easy means of escape

and

from

punishment.
In

other words

extra-territoriality

should be the

complement of extradition,--the one beginning where the other
ends.

